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CONTINGENT CLAIMS AGAINST DECEDENTS' ESTATES:
A NEED FOR LEGISLATION IN TEXAS
by Michael E. Alexander
The law provides for the orderly administration of decedents' estates so
that the personal assets of the decedent can be collected by the personal rep-
resentative in order to pay the lawful claims against the estate and distribute
any surplus to the heirs, devisees, or legatees. After letters of administration
or letters testamentary are issued to -the personal representative of the estate,
it is 'his Tesponsibility to publish a notice' requiring all persons having claims
against .the estate to present them within the time prescribed by the state's
nonclaim statute.
A nonclaim statute is a special statute of limitations which establishes a
definite time limit within which claims against the estate must be presented
to the personal representative or the probate court. 2 Such statutes provide
for :the speedy settlement and liquidation of estates and eliminate the uncer-
tainty which would arise if some time limit were not imposed. Without a
nonclaim statute the personal representative and distributees of the estate
could never be certain that all claims against the estate had been made, until
the general statute of limitations which applies to all claims had expired.8
While most claims against an estate are absolute in liability and liquidated
in amount, contingent claims which should be disposed of during administra-
tion may also exist. A contingent claim is defined as one "where liability
depends upon some future event, which may or may not happen, which ren-
ders it uncertain whether there will ever be liability."'4 Although most states
1. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 294 (1956). The personal representative must pub-
lish notice in a newspaper printed in the county where the letters were issued, or if there
is no newspaper, he must post notice at the county courthouse within one month after
issuance of letters. For discussion of the inadequacy of the notice provisions in Texas,
see Comment, The Unconstitutionality of the Notice Provision of the Texas Probate
Code, 23 Sw. L.J. 890 (1969).
2. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298 (1956), as amended, TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 298(a) (Supp. 1974). This statute requires the creditor to file his claim within
six months after letters are issued to the personal representative. The creditor can file
a claim after that time but payment of his claim will be postponed until all creditors
who filed within six months have been paid, unless the tardy creditor's claim is secured.
The nonclaim statutes of most states, however, simply set a definite time limit after
which claims cannot be filed. For the relevant text of the Texas statute, see note 28
infra.
3. For a general discussion of nonclaim statutes, see T. ATKINSON, LAw OF WILLS
690-92 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ATKINSON].
4. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 151 Fla. 151, 158, 9 So. 2d 355, 357(1942). A contingent claim is to be distinguished from an unmatured claim, where lia-
bility is certain, but has not yet fallen due. For discussion of the distinction between
contingent and unmatured claims, see ATKINSON 702-03.
If the decedent was a guarantor or surety on a note or long-term contract of a third
person, the claim of the creditor will be contingent so long as there has been no default
by the principal debtor as of the date of the decedent's death. See, e.g., Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Bierman, 410 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (indemnity agree-
ment); Hume v. Perry, 136 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), error dismissed (decedent
guaranteed payment of notes). Likewise, a claim against the estate for damages for
breach of a title covenant given by the decedent is contingent. See, e.g., Wiggins v.
Stephens, 246 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922), judgment adopted. Tort claims
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have enacted legislation dealing with contingent claims, Texas has not done
so,6 and a contingent claim is not required to be filed during the nonclaim
period nor at any time during the administration of the estate. If a liability
arising from a contingent claim becomes certain long after the estate has been
distributed and the personal representative has been discharged from his
duties,6 responsibility for its payment will fall on distributees of the decedent's
estate.
This Comment examines the problems of estate administration when con-
tingent claims against the estate exist. Various state statutes, as 'well as the
Model and Uniform Probate Codes, 'will be examined and analyzed in ref-
erence to the method in which contingent claims are handled and the 'advan-
tages and disadvantages to the parties under such provisions. As a result
of this inquiry the Comment contains proposals 'for new legislation in Texas
which is designed to alleviate the problem of contingent claims.
I. CONTINGENT CLAIMS
A. In General
Unless a contingent claim is presented during the administration of the es-
tate so that provisions for its payment may be made at that time, the respon-
sibility for payment of the claim will fall upon the heirs, devisees, and lega-
tees of the estate. 7  Fortunately, nonclaim statutes help to decrease sub-
stantially the possibility of liability to the unknowing distributee after the es-
tate has been closed.
In some states contingent contract claims and all tort claims against the
estate do not have to be presented despite the all-inclusive language of the
nonclaim statutes, which require that "all claims shall be presented or be
forever barred." At least two states, one by statute and the other by case
law, do not even allow a contingent claim to be filed during administration. 9
against the estate for wrongs committed by the decedent before his death are contingent,
see, e.g., Powell v. Buchanan, 245 Miss. 4, 147 So. 2d 110 (1962), and it has also been
held that liability for future rentals under a lease is a contingent claim. See Edgehill
Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 213 So. 2d 225 (1968).
5. In 1955 the Texas Legislature failed to enact proposed legislation which would
have dealt with contingent claims in much the same manner as does the MODEL PRO-
BATE CODE. "As a result, the proper method of handling contingent claims remains a
matter of speculation in this State." Interpretative Commentary, TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 298 (1956).
6. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 318 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-26
(1966); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 193 (1946) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PROBATE
CODE].
7. See Warren, Problems in Probate and Administration, 32 HARV. L. REV. 315,
334 (1919); Comment, Rights of Creditors of a Decedent to Recover from Distributees
After the Estate Is Closed, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 920, 924-25 (1943).
8. See ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 211 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 193 (1961);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298(c) (1956). The Alabama and Texas courts have held
that the legislatures did not intend to include contingent claims as being within the limi-
tation of the nonclaim statute. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Kuykendall, 287
Ala. 36, 247 So. 2d 356 (1971); Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 213 So. 2d
225 (1968); Hume v. Perry, 136 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), error dismissed. But
see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Hobbs, 144 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1944), in which the court
interpreted N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-8-3 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1973), as requiring
contingent claims to be filed, notwithstanding the general language of the statute.
9. See Olsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 368 Ill. 194, 13 N.E.2d 159
(1938); Union Trust v. Shoemaker, 258 I11. 564, 101 N.E. 1050 (1913); MINN. STAT.
§ 525.411 (Supp. 1974).
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It logically follows that if the presentment of a contingent claim is not re-
quired or allowed, it is not barred when it subsequently becomes absolute
and the creditor seeks to enforce it.1O The general statutes of limitation do
not begin to run against the creditor's action on the claim until liability be-
comes absolute, since the creditor could not enforce the claim in court before
that time.1
Because contingent claims are not required to be filed, the distributee
could be held responsible for a claim which he did not know existed; one
which he may be financially incapable of satisfying because he has exhausted
his share of the estate in reliance -upon the final accounting which had taken
place ostensibly before closing the estate. The creditor whose contingent
claim becomes absolute at a later date may also suffer from his failure to
file a contingent claim 12 because he is likely to experience difficulty either
in locating the distributees or in bringing them within the jurisdiction of the
state courts.
In those states where the filing of contingent claims is required, the dis-
tributees may suffer the loss of enjoyment of a portion of the estate due to
the retention of assets sufficient to meet contingent claims should liability
ever become absolute. This retention could conceivably continue far beyond
the lifetime of the distributee. Thus, both in states where filing of contingent
claims is required and in those in which it is not, the claim will cause both
the distributees and creditor inconveniences and burdens.
B. Tort Claims Against the Estate
A tort claim asserted against a decedent's estate is within the definition
of a contingent claim, for liability depends upon a future event, that is, a
favorable judgment or settlement for the plaintiff, an event which may or
may not happen. Yet, even in some states which require presentment of con-
tingent claims, those in tort are not required, nor, in some cases, allowed to
be filed. The reasoning advanced is that nonclaim statutes generally apply
only to claims in contract and not to those in tort.' 3 For example, the Mon-
tana nonclaim statute specifically states that it is applicable only to "claims
arising upon contracts."'1 4 Although the Nebraska statute does not specifi-
cally exclude tort claims,' 5 the courts have held that an unliquidated claim
in tort is not a contingent claim. 16  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
ruled likewise, applying the general statute of limitations to tort claims and
not the nonclaim statute.' 7
10. Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 213 So. 2d 225 (1968); Perkins v.
Cain's Coffee Co., 466 S.W.2d 801, 802-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971);
Hume v. Perry, 136 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), error dismissed.
11. See, e.g., Zaruba v. Boethel, 393 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1965).
12. There is no case law in Texas stating that the contingent creditor may file his
claim even though he is not required to do so.
13. ATKINSON 696-98.
14. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-2704 (1947); see Hornbeck v. Richards, 80
Mont. 27, 32, 257 P. 1025, 1027 (1927).
15. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-704 (1964).
16. Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949).
17. Lounsbury v. Eberlein, 2 Wis. 2d 112, 86 N.W.2d 12 (1957), noted in 1958 Wis.
L. REV. 652. However, the nonclaim statute in Wisconsin specifically provides that tort
claims are not included within its meaning. Wis. STAT. § 859.01(3) (1971).
1974]
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The Texas Probate Code provides that administration shall be closed on
an estate when all debts known to exist against the estate have been paid.' 8
If the tort claimant has instituted suit in the county or district court against
the estate of the decedent, the claim cannot be paid until it is established
by judgment. Although section 405 of the Probate Code requires the per-
sonal representative to list any debts still owing by the estate,' 9 he cannot
fulfill this requirement so long as there is a pending suit which might result
in a judgment establishing the liability of the estate. Since Texas does not
require the filing of contingent claims, tort claims will not present a problem
different from that with other contingent claims. However, a statute enacted
in Texas covering contingent claims should expresssly be made applicable to
contingent claims in contract as well as those in tort.20
By not requiring the filing of tort claims, the distributee's ability to enjoy
his distribution from the estate is burdened in the same manner as when other
contingent claims exist but are not filed. 2' This burden, however, will be
alleviated by the termination of the statute of limitations applicable to tort
claims. 22 But in cases such as medical malpractice suits, the statute does not
begin to run until the injury or damage is discovered by the plaintiff, 23 so
that the burden may extend over a longer period than the number of years
in the statute of limitations.
It would be more plausible to require tort claims to be filed with other
contingent claims, as is done in Colorado2 4 and Florida.25 The Indiana stat-
ute26 provides a somewhat unique solution to the tort claims problem. Theo-
retically the claimant does not have to file his claim before bringing suit, but
if he does not, any judgment in his favor cannot affect the distribution made
to the heirs, legatees, or devisees of the decedent tortfeasor. 27  The estate
may be reopened in the absence of a filing, but the claimant can collect only
from assets remaining in the hands of the personal representative. This is
a good method for handling tort claims as the estate may 'be closed before
there is a determination of tort liability. The distributees are protected, and
if the estate is reopened, the personal representative is not personally liable.
The creditor is given an incentive to file his claim, since he knows his recov-
ery might be severely limited if he does not.
18. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 404 (1956). "Paid" as used here means fully paid
or paid to the extent of the assets available to the personal representative.
19. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 405(a) (4) (1956).
20. See 1958 Wis. L. REV. 652, 654-56.
21. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
22. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
23. Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Ore. 1,452 P.2d 564 (1969).
24. Meyers v. Williams, 137 Colo. 325, 324 P.2d 788 (1958) (wrongful death ac-
tion).
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (Supp. 1974). The statute provides that all claims,
including those which are contingent, must be filed, "including but not limited to, actions
founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or commission of the decedent .... "
26. IND. CODE § 29-1-14-1 (1972). The statute requires that all claims "founded




C. Contingent Claims in Texas
In Texas the nonclaim statute makes no express reference to contingent
claims. 28  Similarly, the cases state that the creditor is not required to file
his claim, 29 but no case has clearly said that the creditor is prohibited from
filing it. In Hume v. Perry30 the decedent had assigned seven promissory
notes in his possession to the plaintiff as partial payment for land conveyed
by the plaintiff to the decedent. When the obligor defaulted on the notes,
the decedent and plaintiff entered into an agreement whereby the plaintiff
extended the time for payment of -the notes, and the decedent guaranteed
their payment if the obligor again defaulted. Default occurred after the de-
cedent's death, but the distributees asserted that the claim had not been
timely presented as required by the nonclaim statute and was, therefore,
barred. In rejecting this contention, the court stated:
While the language of the statute is general, and is sufficiently compre-
hensive to include all claims for money against the estate of a deceased
person, the courts have limited its application to those where the amount
claimed is fixed and definite, not contingent or indeterminate, and which
are susceptible of verification by affidavit. 31
Thus, the distributees were liable for a claim presented after administration
had terminated and for which they had no notice prior to or during adminis-
tration. With proper notice of an existing contingent claim, at least they
would have been aware that they might be liable for its future payment. The
reasoning of the court was predicated upon the fact that a contingent claim
could not be authenticated as required by the statute.3 2  The personal rep-
resentative could not accept the claim without such verification and therefore
it was not a claim for money within the meaning of the nonclaim statute.
28. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 298(a) (Supp. 1974), 298(c) (1956):
[a] All claims for money against a testator or intestate shall be pre-
sented to the executor or administrator within six months after the
original grant of letters testamentary or of administration; otherwise
the payment thereof shall be postponed until the claims which have
been presented within six months and allowed by the executor or ad-
ministrator and approved by the court have been first entirely paid;
provided, however, that the failure of the holder of a secured claim
to present his claim within said six month period shall not cause his
claim to be postponed, but it shall be treated as a claim to be paid in
accordance with subsequent provisions of this Code.
[c] Nqo'claims against a decedent or ward, or against the estate of either,
on which a suit is barred by a general statute of limitation applicable
thereto shall be allowed by a personal representative. If allowed by
the representative and the court is satisfied that limitation has run,
the claim shall be disapproved.
29. See, e.g., Greer's Estate v. Cooper, 50 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1932), error ref.; Hume v. Perry, 136 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), error dismissed;
National Guar. Loan & Trust Co. v. Fly, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 533, 69 S.W. 231 (1902).
Because there is no procedure for disposing of contingent claims in Texas, the present-
ment of a contingent claim to the personal representative would most likely result in
his disallowance of it.
30. 136 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), error dismissed.
31. Id. at 596.
32. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 301 (1956), which requires the creditors to sub-
mit an affidavit stating that "the claim is just and that all legal offsets, payments, and
credits known to the affiant have been allowed."
19741
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The distributees could not have pleaded the general statute of limitations,
since it did not begin to run until the claim became ,absol-ute.83
Under Texas law, the distributees are not liable for an amount exceeding
that received by them in partition and distribution of the estate.34 However,
the defense of change of position8 5 will not be available to them if the contin-
gent claim 'becomes absolute. ,In Perkins v. Cain's 'Coffee Co.36 the plaintiff
brought suit against the heirs of the intestate decedent for injuries sustained
in an automobile collision caused by the decedent. The court stated that un-
der section 37 of the Probate Code property and funds of the decedent re-
ceived by the distributees are subject to the payment of the decedent's debts,
and a creditor may follow the property or funds into the hands of the dis-
tributees.37  The court further reasoned that if the distributees were to
change the form of the property or otherwise dispose of it so as to render
it incapable of being traced, they would be personally liable to the claimant
for the value of the property received by them, up to the amount of the
debt.3 s This is obviously a harsh result, because the nonclaim statute does
not require the filing of a contingent claim and thus the distributee has no
notice of the claim and is not able to spend or sell his portion of the estate
safely.39
If the distributees are exposed to liability in the future, the question arises
whether their liability for the property received by -them will be measured
by its value at the time of distribution or at the time the creditor brings his
suit against them. Although 'the Texas Probate Code in section 269 limits
distributee liability to the amount of the ,funds or property received, 40 section
318 limits liability using the term "value" without delineating 'the time at
which the value is to be measured. 41 The Texas courts have not dealt with
the question directly, but have indicated that liability will extend no further
than the value at the time of distribution. In City of Fort Worth v. Banner4 2
the court refused recovery to the creditor because the creditor did not prove
the value of the property the distributee had received. Stating that it was
the creditor's burden to "establish the value of the property as so received, '43
the decision indicated that value is measured as of the time of distribution.
33. See, e.g., Zaruba v. Boethel, 393 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1965).
34. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 269 (1956). This statute states that "no one of such
distributees shall be liable beyond his just proportion of the estate he shall have received
in the distribution."
35. The equitable defense of change of position may apply where a person has ma-
terially changed his position in a way that he would not have had he known facts as-
sumed to be true were actually false. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 142 (1937).
36. 466 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971).
37. Id. at 802.
38. Id. at 802-03.
39. See Comment, Right of Creditors of a Decedent to Recover From Distributees
After the Estate is Closed, 41 MICH. L. REV. 921, 936 (1943), where the writer asserts,
contrary to the view in Texas, that the defense of change of position would be available,
although the distributee may experience difficulty in proving to the jury or court that
he had no notice of the claim.
40. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 269 (1956).
41. Id. § 318.
42. 328 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959), error ref. n.r.e.
43. Id. at 242.
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Hume and Perkins illustrate the inequitable results which may follow when
a state does not require presentment of contingent claims during the nonclaim
period. The distributees do not have notice of a claim which may be asserted
against them after the estate is closed. Once the claim becomes absolute,
they are liable regardless of whether they have acted in reliance upon the
administration of the estate by exhausting or otherwise disposing of the prop-
erty thereby obtained. 44 -If the creditor cannot trace the assets received into
the hands of the distributees, he will have a lien on the portion of the estate
each distributee received, and he may enforce his claim against them per-
sonally.45 The creditor may argue that this result is not inequitable because
the distributee has nothing more than a windfall, and ,his liability is limited
to the amount he received at the distribution of the estate. As a matter of
practicality, however, it would be to the creditor's advantage to file his con-
tingent claim during administration because he can assure himself that pay-
ment will be made if the claim later becomes absolute. This will protect him
from later inability to locate the distributees and bring them within the juris-
diction of the court. Other states have enacted statutes which give the dis-
tributees notice of a contingent claim and protect the creditor's right to pay-
ment if the claim becomes absolute. Under such statutes both parties are
protected -to a degree not afforded in Texas.
II. STATUTORY TREATMENT OF CONTINGENT CLAIMS
Currently, legislation in most jurisdictions requires the presentment of
all claims of every nature during the administration of the estate, including
contingent claims. As a result the distributees can take their portion of the
estate and spend it without apprehension of unknown future liability. In
those jurisdictions such as Texas which do not require presentment of contin-
gent claims, post-probate liability of the distributees is the rule.46
It is important to examine the basic approaches to contingent claims in or-
der to design a desirable statutory framework for Texas to enact. Statutes
range from -those which provide for permissive filing of contingent claims47
44. Perkins v. Cain's Coffee Co., 466 S.W.2d 801, 802-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1971).
45. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 269 (1956).
46. See Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 213 So. 2d 225 (1968); Olsen
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 368 Ill. 194, 13 N.E.2d 159 (1938). Ohio has spe-
cific statutory provisions for contingent claims, but they effectively provide only for con-
tingent claims which become absolute before the estate is closed. Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2117.37 (1968). Claims which accrue thereafter need not be presented to the per-
sonal representative and the creditor may proceed against the distributees. Id. §
2117.39.
In Minnesota it is expressly stated that contingent claims shall not be filed. If the
claim becomes absolute before the estate is closed it may be enforced against the per-
sonal representative, but only to the extent that he has assets remaining in his charge.
MINN. STAT. § 525.411 (1969). A right of action against the distributees is preserved
if the personal representative has insufficient assets to pay the claim, or if the claim
becomes absolute after the estate is closed. Id. § 525.43 1.
47. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2610 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-11-
9 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-8 (1966). The Arkansas statute allows permissive
filing but gives the distributee the defense of change of position if suit is brought against
him on a claim which was not filed. The claim "may be enforced against the distribu-
tees to the extent of the assets of the estate, or the proceeds thereof, remaining in the
1974]
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to those which require filing and provide alternative methods to insure the
contingent creditor that he will be paid if his claim becomes absolute. 48
Somewhere between these extremes are those states which require filing of
contingent claims but do not make provisions for how payment is to be in-
sured. 49  Other statutes occupying this middle ground provide for the per-
sonal representative or court to retain assets sufficient to meet the claim if
it becomes due,8 0 and still others require filing within a limited time after
the claim becomes absolute rather than during ,the nonclaim period.8 '
The most common method of providing for contingent claims is to have
the personal representative or court retain assets out of the estate which will
be sufficient to pay the claim if it becomes due. 52 This can be as inequitable
as where no provisions for payment of contingent claims are made since the
distributee is deprived of the use of his portion of the estate, to the degree
it is retained for the contingent claim, for a period which may extend far
beyond his lifetime. As an alternative to this absolute retention of assets,
a trust could be established as will be shown below.53
In 1927 the case of In re Littledon's Estate'.4 held unconstitutional the New
York statute which required the retention of assets when there existed contin-
gent claims against the estate. The factual setting of that case involved a
decedent who was co-maker of a deed of trust, and whose possible liability
could have extended over a period of thirty-six years. The trustee sought
to have the executor set aside $30,000, but the court stated that it could not
"keep an estate from liquidation for a quarter of -a century to aid a claimant
so improvident as to accept a security so indefinite, and maturing, if at all,
far beyond the period of the life of the obligor." 55  Strangely, this statute
remains in effect today despite the fact that Littledon has not been re-
versed. 56
Some states provide relief to distributees against the retention of assets by
limiting the retention to a maximum period, usually two years. 57 If the claim
has not become absolute within that time, the amount retained is distributed
hands of the distributee." Thus, if the creditor cannot trace to assets still retained by
the distributee, the distributee is protected from liability. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2610-
(c) (1971). See Note, Effect of the Nonclaim Statute on a Cause of Action, 10 ARK.
L. REV. 237 (1956).
48. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 953-53.1 (West 1966); IND. CODE § 29-1-14-7
(1972); IOWA CODE § 633.424 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-112 (Supp. 1973);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388 (Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. § 859.21 (1971).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (1964).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-701 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 150.250 (1973); N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 1804 (McKinney 1967).
51. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-11-11, 33-11-12 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 1335-36 (1974) (one year).
52. CAL. PROB. CODE § 953 (West 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-12
(1963); IND. CODE § 29-1-14-7 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-112 (Supp. 1973);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 708.26 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-701 (1964); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 556:6 (1955); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 1804 (McKinney 1967);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 596 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388 (Supp. 1972).
53. See notes 77, 87-88 infra and accompanying text.
54. 129 Misc. 845, 223 N.Y.S. 470 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
55. Id. at 847, 223 N.Y.S. at 475. For discussion of the Littledon case, see Note,
Claims Against the Estate, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 490, 495-96 (1968).
56. Note, supra note 55, at 496.
57. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2610 (1971) (two years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 1334 (1974) (two years).
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and the creditor will be left to his remedy against the distributees.58  Al-
though this provides relief against the retention of assets, -the distributee will
nevertheless be subject to liability if the claim becomes absolute after the dis-
,tribution. His only advantage is that he has had notice of the contingent
claim. To protect the creditor, the court should require that the dis-tributees
give him their bond as security for payment in all cases.
In order to serve best the interests of both creditors and distributees, stat-
utes dealing with contingent claims should provide alternative methods of
payment. Several factors must be considered when provision is made for
payment of a contingent claim, such as -the amount of possible liability, the
number of years over which contingent liability may extend, and the prob-
ability of the claim 'becoming absolute. Some state legislation 'has allowed
the personal representative to compromise the claim,59 and -the distribution
of the estate as if the contingent claim did not exist, leaving the creditor to
his remedy against the distributees if the claim later becomes absolute. 60 In
addition, several states allow the court, in its equitable discretion, to fashion
a remedy appropriate to the particular claim involved. 61 For example, the
Pennsylvania statute allows the court to make "such other provisions for the
disposition or satisfaction of the claim as shall be equitable."62
There are also statutes which do not require presentment of the claim dur-
ing probate, but require the creditor to bring an action against the personal
representative if the estate is not closed, or otherwise against the distributees,
within a certain period after the claim becomes absolute. Thus, in Nebraska,
the creditor is given one year within which to enforce his claim against the
personal representative or distributees. 63 The only apparent advantage of
provisions of this type is that the distributees would be subject to liability for
a shorter period of time than under the general statute of limitations, which
in most jurisdictions bar claims presented after a period of from one to four
years after the claim arose. 64
During the years 1939 and 1940 Professor Thomas E. Atkinson wrote a
series of articles for the Journal of the American Judicature Society on pro-
bate 'proceedings and concluded the series with an article entitled "Wanted-
A Model Probate Code."'65 Professor Atkinson observed that a uniform pro-
bate act was needed in order to draw the -best ideas 'from the statutes of all
the states in order to meet rapidly increasing demand for a coherent, efficient,
and economical probate system.66
58. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, H§ 1853, 2654 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,§ 1336 (1974). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2610(a) (1971), wherein the court
may require the distributees to give their bond as security to the contingent creditor
when distribution is made after two years.
59. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388 (1972).
60. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-14-7 (1972); IOWA CODE § 633.424 (1964); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-112 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. § 859.21 (1971).
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-112(d) (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388(3)
(1972); Wis. STAT. § 859.21(4) (1971).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388(3) (1972).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-704 (1964).
64. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 337 (West Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11 (1960); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN arts. 5526-27 (1958).
65. 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 183 (1940).
66. The Model Probate Code was the result of Professor Atkinson's initiative, with
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The Model Probate Code drew the 'best provisions from the state probate
codes but added nothing new of its own. As to contingent claims it provided
three alternatives: compromise of the claim on approval of the court,6 7 reten-
tion of assets for two years followed by distribution if the claim had not be-
come due or had not been extinguished,08 or distribution as if the claim did
not exist with the distributees remaining liable on the claim. 69 Relief under
any of the alternatives was conditioned upon 'the contingent creditor filing
his claim within the nonclaim period.70
Although the Model Probate Code offered nothing that was not already
provided in some state statutes, its draftsmen gave important commentary as
to why contingent claim legislation was necessary. They adopted the policy
that a decedent's estate should be settled and closed as soon as possible after
the death of the decedent. 71 It was recognized that if the nonclaim statute
did not require filing of contingent claims, barring the claim afterwards if not
filed, then the distributee could "never spend his legacy or inheritance safely,
for he would never know when such a claim could be asserted against him."'7 2
Even with a court order than might render the distributees liable in the fu-
ture, the draftsmen observed, "at least they know the character of the claim.
Under the older view they have no way of knowing what claims may be as-
serted against them at some future time."' 73
,In 1969 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drafted the Uniform Probate Code. While the draftsmen did look to the laws
of the states as guidelines, they also attempted "to reflect the normal desire
of the owner of wealth as -to disposition of his property at death," 74 and thus
the draftsmen felt that ",the prevailing patterns in wills" were useful in deter-
mining probate laws, especially those concerning the property owner who dies
intestate. 75  To date, only North Dakota has enacted the Code in its en-
tirety.7 6 However, it has been enacted in part by some thirteen states, in-
cluding Texas, and has otherwise influenced legislation.
As to contingent Claims, the Uniform Probate Code introduced a new ap-
proach. One alternative for the payment of a contingent claim is the estab-
lishment of a trust so that payment may be made from the principal of the
trust if the claim should become due.77 The Uniform Probate Code does not
its drafting undertaken by the American Bar Association's Section on Real Property,Probate, and Trust Law, with the assistance of the state bar associations and the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School. See generally P. BASYE & L. SIMES, PROBLEMS IN PRO-
BATE LAw 5-9 (1946); Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1037 (1966).
67. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 140(a); see note 59 supra and accompanying text.68. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 140(b); see notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.69. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 140(c); see note 60 supra and accompanying text.70. MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 135(a), 140.
71. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 135, Comment at 142.
72. Id. See generally Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate
Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REv. 321, 336 (1947); Comment, The Model Probate
Code: A Critique, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 548 (1948).
73. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 135, Comment at 143.
74. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, General Comment at 21.
75. Id.
76. Act of 1973, ch. 257, [1973] N.D. Laws 43d Sess. 627. The new Code will not
go into effect, however, until July 1, 1975.
77. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-810(b) (2).
[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
specifically state how the trust is to be established, so presumably the court
would be given broad discretion in this matter. The income of the trust could
be distributed at regular intervals to the distributees, up to the amount they
were to receive by the decedent's will or by intestacy, plus interest. The
principal would be reserved for the payment of the claim.
While the Model Probate Code restricts the court to -the three methods set
out above,78 the Uniform Probate Code grants the court -the broad discretion
given by the Maryland, 79 Pennsylvania,80 and Wisconsin" statutes, to formu-
late its own remedy for -the payment of the contingent claim. The Uniform
Probate Code states that payment may 'be provided for by a trust, mortgage,
bond, or security from a distributee, or otherwise.82 This gives the court the
ability to handle unusual situations where the alternatives given for payment
are not suited to the needs of the parties.
In addition, the Uniform Probate Code solves the issue of valuation by pro-
viding that value is to be measured as of the time of distribution.83 Establish-
ment of the trust method is more satisfactory than any of the provisions of
the Model Probate Code and state statutes, thus making the method proposed
by the Uniform Probate Code a superior tool for handling contingent
claims.
III. STATUTORY PROPOSAL
If the decedent had been able to foresee that there might be a contingent
claim against his estate as the result of a transaction into which he was enter-
ing, he could have provided a method for disposal of the claim in an agree-
ment with the creditor or with a provision in his will. But when the decedent
has not had such foresight, the legislature must fashion a statutory framework
which is designed to dispose of the claim in a way which closely parallels
the method by which the decedent would have satisfied it. It is submitted
that the following proposed statute, which combines the best features of the
state statutes as well as the Model and Uniform Probate Codes, should be
adopted as a means of handling contingent claims against a decedent's estate
in Texas. Following each division and subdivision in the proposed statute
is commentary explaining the basis for inclusion of the specific provision. It
should 'be noted that along with the statute proposed, the Texas nonclaim
statute8 4 should be amended so that contingent claims are expressly required
to 'be filed during the nonclaim period, and so that it is clear that both con-
tractual and tort claims are included within the filing requirement.
(a) If a claim which is contingent or unliquidated has been -filed in
the manner provided in § 298, the court may provide for pay-
ment as follows:
78. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-112(d) (1957).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388(3) (1972).
81. WiS. STAT. § 859.21(4) (1971).
82. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-810(b)(2).
83. Id. § 3-1004, Comment.
84. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298 (1956), as amended, TEx. PROn. CODE ANN.
§ 298(a) (Supp. 1974).
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(1) If ;the claimant consents, he may be paid the present or
agreed claim, taking any uncertainty into consideration.85
This provision would be desirable if the possibility of the claim becoming due
is almost a certainty. 'If it is uncertain whether in the future the claim will
become absolute, this method would not be advantageous to the creditor be-
cause he would likely receive little on his claim. Likewise, the distributee
under this method suffers by a loss of a portion of the estate if payment is
made on a claim which later does not become absolute and payable. These,
of course, are factors which cannot accurately be foreseen before the claim
becomes due or is extinguished. Under present law in Texas, the personal
representative may compromise doubtful debts against the estate only with
the court's approval."s It is advisable that a statute covering contingent
claims require such court approval for compromise of contingent claims so
that the personal representative will be protected from future liability if the
choice turns out to have been poor, and so that the guidance of the court may
be available when weighing all the factors which must be considered if a
contingent claim is to be compromised.
(2) Arrangement for future payment on the happening of the
contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a
trust or by obtaining a bond or security from a distributee.87
The trust is selected as an alternative method to the straight retention of as-
sets because of the inequity presented by the latter.88  This is the most satis-
factory way to deal with contingent claims, unless it appears certain that the
claim will become absolute, in which case alternative (1) should be em-
ployed. The statute leaves to -the court broad discretion as to the establish-
ment and particulars of the trust so as to enable it to take into consideration
the individual facts surrounding a specific claim.
(3) Distribution of the estate may be made as though such con-
tingent claim did not exist; but -the distributees shall be li-
able to the creditor to the extent of the estate received by
them if the contingent claim thereafter becomes absolute.
The court may require the distributees to give bond for the
performance of their liability ,to the contingent creditor.8 9
Although this alternative will leave the distributees exposed to future liability,
it is preferable if the likelihood of the claim becoming due is remote.90 The
distributees will have received notice of the claim because of its presentment
during the nonclaim period, and the creditor may protect himself by obtaining
bond from the distributees as security for payment.
(4) Such other provisions for the disposition or satisfaction of
the claim as shall be equitable may be made.9'
85. The source for this provision is UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-810(b)(1).
86. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 234 (Supp. 1974).
87. The source for this provision is UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-810(b)(2).
88. See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
89. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 140(c) serves as the source for this alternative.
90. See Comment, Executors and Administrators-Right of Creditors of a Decedent
To Recover from Distributees Alter the Estate Is Closed, 41 MICH. L. REV. 920 (1943);
41 COLUM. L. REV. 950 (1941); 27 CORNELL L.Q. 111 (1941).
91. The source for this alternative is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3388(3) (1972).
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This provision allows the court to take into consideration the circumstances
surrounding the claim and fashion an equitable remedy which suits the needs
of the distributees and the creditor. Such a provision has merit because it
provides 'a "catch-all" whereby the court may take into account the nature
of the claim, the possibility of its 'becoming due, and the position of the dis-
tributees and creditors in relation to the hardships which may be imposed
on them by retention of assets or post-administration liability.
(b) If the contingent claim shall become absolute before distribution
of the estate, it shall be paid in the same manner as absolute
claims of the same class. 92
This section needs little explanation, for if the claim becomes absolute before
distribution it obviously is to the advantage of all parties to dispose of it dur-
ing administration.
(c) A contingent or unliquidated claim shall be supported by the affi-
davit of the claimant showing the facts upon which the contingent
or unliquidated liability is based and the probable amount there-
of.
98
This provision provides a method for verification of the contingent claim.
Texas and most states require that absolute claims be verified or authenti-
cated by the affidavit of -the creditor stating that the claim is just and true
and that all offsets and credits have been allowed.9 4 A contingent creditor
could not authenticate his claim under such requirements because he could
not state that his claim is just and true. The above method of verification
provides a substitute appropriate for contingent claims, and in essence, the
contingent creditor gives all the information about his claim 'that he can.
(d) After assets of an estate have been distributed, an undischarged
claim not barred may be prosecuted in a proceeding against one or
more distributees. No distributee shall be liable to claimants for
amounts in excess of the value of his distribution as of the time
of distribution. As between distributees, each shall bear the cost
of satisfaction of unbarred claims as if the claim had been satis-
fied in the course of administration. Any distributee who shall
have failed to notify other distributees of the demand made upon
him by the claimant in sufficient time to permit them to join in
any proceeding in which the claim was asserted against him loses
his right of contribution against other distributees.9 5
This final section of the proposed statute allows recovery by the contingent
creditor from the distributees. The creditor, however, must have filed his
contingent claim during the nonclaim period because otherwise it would be
barred by this writer's proposed amendment to the Texas nonclaim statute.9 6
This provision is intended to provide for the situation where the contingent
92. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 140 is the source for this section.
93. The source for this provision is N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAw § 1804 (McKinney
1967).
94. See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 301 (1956).
95. The source for this provision is UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1004.
96. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298 (1956), as amended, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.§ 298(a) (Supp. 1974); see note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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claim is filed and the parties elect to distribute the estate as if the contingent
claim did not exist, under section (a)(3) above. In addition, this section
allows the contingent creditor whose claim was not allowed by the personal
representative to prosecute a suit against the distributees. The distributees
are given the right of contribution against each other provided the proper no-
tice is given. Finally, the provision defines the time of valuation of the por-
tion of the estate received by each distributee as being when the distribution
is made. 97
IV. CONCLUSION
It is evident that legislation is needed in Texas which would require the
filing of contingent claims during the nonclaim period and provide for their
disposition in a manner as is proposed above. A noted Texas attorney has
stated: "Both orderly administration and the best interests of creditors would
seem 'to be served by disposing of such [contingent] claims in probate
proceeding rather than 'by permitting a separate proceeding in another court
as is the present practice.19 8 When such legislation is forthcoming, probate
procedure will further be advanced by a more speedy and final settlement
of an estate where contingent claims are involved.
97. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
98. Furse, Claim Practice in Probate Matters, 34 TEx. B.J. 667, 681 (1971).
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